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While the tax administrators continuously implement more efficient enforcement activities 
to enhance tax compliance, voluntary disclosure programmes (VDP) or tax amnesties can 
also be a good tax policy to reduce the tax gap. There is ample evidence that this program 
can work wonders if executed carefully. In addition, taxpayer participation in this 
programme is also an essential aspect to ensure its successful implementation. In the 
Malaysian context, VDP was launched in year 2015 and 2016 as part of the budget 
recalibration process to boost revenue and improve compliance. The effectiveness of the 
program is yet to be unresolved but statistics shows that taxpayers’ responses were far below 
expectation. In spite of the poor responses to VDP and high reliance of taxpayers on tax 
professionals, this study attempts to explore tax professionals’ perceptions on reasons 
contributing to tax payers’ participation in Malaysian VDP. A survey approach is used to 
obtain information from tax practitioners (n=135) practicing in big four tax firms in Johor 
Bahru and Kuala Lumpur using purposive sampling method. The finding of this study reveals 
that all the reasons i.e. size of penalty reduction, fear of detection and punishment, risk of 
further audit and promotion efforts by IRBM are contributing to the VDP participation 
although the level of agreement is differs. Malaysian tax professionals perceives the size of 
penalty reduction as the strongest  influential reason contributing to VDP participation while 
the risk of further audit was ranked as the second most important reason. Meanwhile, fear of 
detection and punishment and promotion efforts by IRBM were ranked as third and fourth 
reasons respectively. This study could be considered as the first attempt in understanding 
VDP implementation in Malaysia and the findings are expected to spark for future studies in 
this area.  
 



















Walaupun pentadbir cukai terus melaksanakan aktiviti penguatkuasaan yang lebih cekap 
untuk meningkatkan pematuhan cukai, program pengemukaan sukarela (VDP) atau 
pengampunan cukai juga boleh menjadi dasar cukai yang baik untuk mengurangkan jurang 
cukai. Terdapat bukti yang cukup bahawa program ini dapat berfungsi dengan baik jika 
dilaksanakan dengan teliti. Di samping itu, penyertaan pembayar cukai dalam program ini 
juga merupakan aspek penting untuk memastikan pelaksanaannya berjaya. Dalam konteks 
Malaysia, VDP dilancarkan pada tahun 2015 dan 2016 sebagai sebahagian daripada proses 
pengubahsuaian belanjawan untuk meningkatkan pendapatan dan meningkatkan pematuhan. 
Keberkesanan program ini belum dapat dinilai tetapi statistik menunjukkan bahawa 
penyertaan pembayar cukai jauh di bawah jangkaan. Walaupun kurang respon terhadap VDP 
dan kebergantungan para pembayar cukai yang tinggi terhadap profesional cukai, kajian ini 
cuba meneroka persepsi para profesional cukai mengenai sebab-sebab yang menyumbang 
kepada penyertaan pembayar cukai dalam VDP Malaysia. Pendekatan kaji selidik digunakan 
untuk mendapatkan maklumat daripada profesional cukai (n=135) daripada empat firma 
cukai besar di Johor Bahru dan Kuala Lumpur menggunakan kaedah pensampelan bertujuan. 
Penemuan kajian ini mendedahkan bahawa semua sebab iaitu saiz pengurangan penalti, 
bimbang kepada pengesanan dan hukuman, risiko pengauditan selanjutnya dan usaha 
promosi oleh LHDNM menyumbang kepada penyertaan VDP walaupun tahap persetujuan 
berbeza. Para profesional cukai Malaysia merasakan saiz pengurangan penalti sebagai sebab 
paling kuat yang menyumbang kepada penyertaan VDP sementara risiko pengauditan 
selanjutnya disenaraikan sebagai sebab kedua paling penting. Sementara itu, bimbang 
kepada pengesanan dan hukuman dan usaha promosi oleh LHDNM menduduki tempat 
ketiga dan keempat. Kajian ini boleh dianggap sebagai percubaan pertama dalam memahami 
pelaksanaan VDP di Malaysia dan penemuannya dijangka mencetuskan kajian masa depan 
dalam bidang ini. 
 
 
Kata kunci: program pendedahan sukarela, pengampunan cukai, penyertaan, profesional 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
Voluntary disclosure programme (VDP) is an opportunity offered to a taxpayer to 
rectify error or omissions in past tax returns with partial or full waiver of financial 
penalties and criminal prosecutions. It is considers as part of  compliance strategy 
used by tax administrators which allows previously non-compliant tax payers to 
regularise their tax affairs subject to terms specified in the programme (OECD, 2015). 
 
Currently, there are 47 countries that offer VDP (OECD, 2015). For instances, 
Canada, which adopts self-reporting system like Malaysia (self-assessment system), 
has implemented VDP for many years that allows taxpayers to disclose errors and 
omission without subject to penalty or prosecution. Similarly, Australia has launched 
VDP in 2014 with the title ‘Project DO IT’ that is a never repeated ‘one-time’ offer to 
declare unreported income and assets. Recently, Indonesian government has 
implemented tax amnesty policy from July 2016 to March 2017 which was reported 
as one of the most successful tax amnesty with at least 745,000 taxpayers participated 
and declaring assets more than USD330 billion (Suroyo & Setiaji, 2017). Similarly, 
2018 tax amnesty scheme in Pakistan also reported that nearly 5,000 people filed 
voluntary disclosure returns as at 30 June 2018 whereby the government has received 






Although the scope of the programme in each country may vary in term of coverage 
and incentives, the existence of VDP in many countries strongly indicates that it is an 
important tax compliance initiative with minimum cost to tax administrators. Apart 
from raising revenue quickly in short term, a well-planned VDP can help to increase 
the tax base by identifying taxpayers in the middle section of the compliance pyramid 
as illustrated in figure 1.1. The middle section taxpayers were those initially non-
compliant with all or part of their tax obligations but willing to participate in VDP. 
However, their decision to participate depends entirely on the design of the VDP 











Figure 1.1  
The Compliance Pyramid & Voluntary Disclosure 









Pay tax, plus interest, 
plus applicable penalties, 
plus possible fines and 
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Avail themselves of 
Voluntary Disclosure 
Programmes to pay tax 
plus interest and/or a 
penalty and/or a fine  





In Malaysia, Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (IRBM) has always rewards 
taxpayers who opt to self-correct their tax affairs before commencement of audit or 
investigation activities by offering reduced penalty rate which range from 10% - 35% 
as compared to audit/investigation penalty rates of 45% - 300%. The rates vary 
depending on the period of making voluntary disclosures from the tax return due date 
as demonstrated in Table 1.1.  
 
Table 1.1 
Voluntary Disclosure Rates under Tax Audit Framework 
Period of making voluntary disclosures Tax Audit 
Framework prior 
to 01st May 2017 
Tax Audit 
Framework effective 
from 1st May 2017 
60 days after the tax return due date. 10% 10% 
More than 60 days but not later than 6 months 
from the tax return due date. 
15.5% 15.5% 
6 months to 1 year 20% 35% 
1 year to 3 years 25% 35% 
3 years and above. 30% 35% 
Voluntary disclosure after taxpayer has been 
informed but before commencement of audit. 
35% Voluntary disclosure 
is no longer allowed 
Source: Tax Audit Framework 2015 and 2017 issued by IRBM on 01 February 2015 and 
              01 May 2017 respectively.  
 
 
On top of permanent voluntary disclosures stipulated in tax audit framework, IRBM 
has implemented special VDP, also known as tax amnesty programme, in year 2015 
and 2016. The programme is applicable to direct taxes administered by the IRBM 
which includes corporate tax, petroleum tax, individual tax, stamp duty and real 





It shows that 15% of penalty was imposed for voluntary disclosure cases which are 
quite attractive as compared to 35% stipulated in tax audit framework. Other penalty 
rates of 25% - 45% applicable for issues discovered by IRBM during audit or 
investigation.  
 
Table 1.2   
Penalty Rates under Special VDP Implemented in Year 2015 & 2016 
Penalty Regime Reduced penalty rates (VDP) 
Incorrect returns :  
Voluntary Disclosure 
15% 
Incorrect returns :  
Discovery by IRBM during  
an audit/investigation 
 
25%  - Full Payment 
35% -  Payment in 6 Instalments 
45% -  More than 6 Instalments 
Tax in arrears Waiver for increase in tax if full settlement is 
  Source: Operation Guideline No. 1/2015 & No.1/2016 issued by IRB on 05 March      
               2015 and 10 February 2016 respectively.  
 
 
Participation of tax payers in VDP signals the effectiveness and success of VDP 
implementation. In Malaysia, there are no precise data to measure taxpayer’s 
responses or participation towards the tax amnesty programme implemented for the 
year 2015 and 2016. However, the following data as presented in Table 1.3 has been 
obtained from IRBM Tax Operation Department which shows the number of audit 








Table 1.3  
Number of Audit Cases Settled by IRBM and Applicable Penalty Rates 
Penalty Rate Number of Cases  (2015) Number of Cases (2016) 
Field Audit Desk Audit Field Audit Desk Audit 
15% 78 54 268 196 
25% 25,702 557 32,888 844 
35% 4,501 468 6,591 393 
45% 22,861 7,836 12,648 5,112 




The data in Table 1.3 shows that audit cases settled with 15% penalty rate reflects 
those taxpayers participated in VDP and other penalty rates applicable to audit 
findings. Based on the table and figures above, only 132 taxpayers (cases) came 
forward to declare incorrect returns voluntarily in year 2015 whereas in the same 
period a total of 61,925 cases of incorrect returns were discovered by IRBM audit 
officers. In fact, the 61,925 taxpayers who have been audited by IRBM had not 
chosen to participate in VDP before the commencement of audit. Similarly, in year 
2016, only 464 taxpayer (cases) have participated in voluntary disclosure programme 
compared to 58,476 of audit cases settled. Furthermore, IRBM also revealed that the 
total non-submission of tax return for the year 2016 is 236,992 and non-payment of 
tax is RM9,465,995,836.09 as at 1 January 2017. Hence, it is a clear evidence that 
those non-compliant taxpayers have failed to take advantage of special VDP 
implemented in 2015 and 2016. 
 
According to Farrar and Hausserman (2016), VDP generate relatively little revenue in 





taxpayer attitudes towards participating in VDP is essential. However, the majority of 
studies conducted on VDP or tax amnesty, only concentrate on the effects of the 
policy and the reasons for taxpayer participation is not stated except for Alm and 
Back (1991) which emphasize that probabilities of detection and punishment are 
important motives to taxpayer participation. Therefore, much remains to be studied on 
the reasons for taxpayer participation in VDP.  
 
Although the VDP is applicable to all groups of taxpayers, arguably it is more 
relevant to business group taxpayers (self-employed and company) as they have 
greater opportunities to under report income and submitting incorrect returns. This is 
evident by most of the Malaysian tax compliance studies which focused on business 
taxpayers as their non-compliance is more significant (see for example Ramasamy, 
Thurasamy, Haron & Ang, 2003; Sia, Salleh, Sambasuvan & Kasipillai, 2008).  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Although IRBM consistently launches various operations and enforcement activities 
to enhance tax compliance, a recent report showed that there had been a consistent 
20% tax gap in Malaysia since 2015 (Syed Nokman, 2017). The IRB Chief was 
reported to state that tax collection in 2016 was RM114 billion instead of the targeted 
RM136.8 billion while in 2015, the IRB received RM121 billion out of its projected 
RM145.2 billion. The tax gap in the revenue collected by IRBM in the year 2015 and 
2016 can be related to participation in VDP implemented in these two years. The 
IRBM launched VDP with the objective of increasing revenue by offering special 





is also part of budget recalibration process and improving existing compliance 
(IRBM, 2016).  
 
Although actual participation in VDP is not available, the data related to the number 
of audit cases settled by IRBM and applicable penalty rates indicates that the number 
of taxpayers participated in VDP is far lower than the cases in which incorrect returns 
were discovered during audit processes. This situation has raised concerns on the 
acceptance and participation of taxpayers to VDP offered by IRBM. Indeed, signals 
that participation of taxpayers in special VDP implemented by IRBM is very poor. 
 
However, it does not mean that VDP is not relevant in the context of Malaysia as 
there are consistent demands for the programme. For example, Datuk NK Jasani, 
partner of Grant Thornton Malaysia, proposed to the government that instead of 
depending on higher penalties to help boost revenue, the government should again 
consider tax amnesty (Grant Thornton, 2017). The growing demand shows that VDP 
can be used as an effective compliance strategy to reduce the reported tax gap in 
Malaysia if the design of the programme is well accepted among taxpayers especially 
those in the middle section of the compliance triangle as shown in Figure 1.1. Thus, 
poor participation of VDP is a significant practical gap that need to be studied for a 
successful VDP implementation in the future.  
 
Currently, there is no published research conducted on VDP in Malaysia. Overseas 
studies on VDP or tax amnesty mainly focused on the effects of VDP to government 





Luitel & Sobel, 2007; Schmittdiel, 2015) and future compliance level (Alm & Beck, 
1993; Christian, Gupta & Young, 2002; Rechberger, Hartner, Kirchler & Hammerle, 
2010; Torgler, Schaltegger & Schaffner, 2003). There is no published studies that 
examine the participation of taxpayers in the VDP. In fact, there is dearth of 
information on the reasons for taxpayer reluctant to participate in this programme 
which they should take the opportunity given to reduce tax burden. Thus, it is 
essential to investigate the possible reasons for taxpayers’ participation in VDP.  Due 
to high reliance of business taxpayers on tax professionals, this study examine poor 
VDP participation from the perspective of tax professionals in Malaysia.  
 
1.3 Research Question 
The research question to be addressed in this study is as follows: 
Do tax professionals perceive size of penalty reduction, fear of detection and 
punishment, risk of further audit and promotion efforts by IRBM as the reasons that 
contribute to VDP participation among taxpayers in Malaysia? 
 
1.4 Research Objective 
This study investigates on the Malaysian taxpayers’ participation in VDP from the 
perspective of tax professionals. Thus, to answer the research question, this study sets 
the objective as follows:   
To examine perceptions of tax professionals whether size of penalty reduction, fear of 
detection and punishment, risk of further audit and promotion efforts by IRBM are the 






1.5       Significance of the Study 
The outcome of this exploratory study redound to the benefit of tax administrators, 
particularly IRBM, considering that a well-planned VDP could decrease the tax gap 
without incurring additional administration cost. Besides that, the study also 
highlights the drawbacks of existing VDP and recommendations provided by 
respondents to improve the effectiveness of VDP. Undoubtedly, this feedback will be 
an important information source for IRBM to evaluate the previous VDP and 
incorporate tax professionals’ opinion into the future versions of VDP. 
 
On the other hand, the study will contribute to the literature on VDP or tax 
amnesty. Currently, there is no published academic study on VDP in Malaysia. Thus, 
this study is exploratory in nature to gain better understanding of Malaysian VDP 
especially the reasons that motivating taxpayer’s participation. A greater 
understanding of VDP will encourage future research relating to VDP in Malaysia. 
On top of that, this study also contributes to tax compliance literature by identifying 
the reasons or motives for taxpayers to self-correct their tax affairs. 
 
1.6       Scope of Study 
This study seeks perceptions of tax professionals on reasons for low taxpayer’s 
participation in special VDP introduced by IRBM in year 2015 and 2016. Tax 
professionals are chosen from big four tax firms, namely, KPMG, Ernst and Young, 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers and Deloitte, located in Johor Bahru and Kuala Lumpur. 





penalty reduction, fear of detection and punishment, risk of further audit and 
promotional efforts by IRBM were sought using questionnaire. 
 
1.7 Definition of Key Terms 
Voluntary Disclosure Programmes (VDP) and tax amnesties are relatively low-cost 
compliance initiatives in which taxpayers are given the opportunity to self-correct 
errors and omissions in pas tax returns (Farrar & Hausserman, 2016). Duhaime's Law 
Dictionary defines voluntary disclosure as “a tax amnesty program whereby a 
delinquent taxpayer discloses information not previously reported to a tax agency, 
and by doing so voluntarily, avoids liability to penalty or prosecution normally 
associated with prior non-disclosure” (Duhaime, 2000). Given that both terms of 
VDP and tax amnesty are synonyms, it will be used interchangeably in this study.  
 
1.8 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized into five chapters. The introductory part in Chapter One 
discusses the concept of VDP and its implementation in Malaysia, followed by the 
problem statement, research question, research objective, significance and scope of 
this study.  In Chapter Two, discussions include definition of VDP and past literature 
pertaining to voluntary disclosure issues. Chapter Three discusses the research 
methodology applied in this study including research design, survey method, data 
collection process, target population, sample selection and data analysis. The final 
part of this chapter outlines the questionnaire design and pilot testing before the actual 
data collection.  Chapter Four presents the data analysis and results, and subsequently 





conclusion and recommendations derived from the outcomes of this study. Finally, 
the implications of this study, future research directions and some recommendations 


























As highlighted in Chapter 1, there is not much published empirical studies on VDP 
especially in Malaysia. However, there are quite a number of studies conducted on tax 
amnesties which could be considered as synonymous with VDP. This is held by 
Farrar and Hausserman (2016) of which they clearly stated that both tax amnesties 
and VDP are compliance initiatives with minimum cost in which tax payers are given 
the opportunity for self-correction on past tax returns. They mentioned that the only 
difference between tax amnesties and VDP is a tax amnesty tends to be a one-time 
opportunity for self-correction which has an expiry date whereas VDP are permanent 
and ongoing. However, there are short term VDP with an expiry dates, implemented 
in many countries, including Malaysia. Therefore, there are no major differences on 
tax amnesty and VDP.  For example, Malaysian 2016 VDP has been termed as tax 
amnesty by Ernst and Young in their article titled “Tax Amnesty: Reduction and 
Waiver of Tax Penalties” (Ernst & Young, 2016). In view of the foregoing, for the 
purpose of this study, these two terms will be used interchangeably.  
 
Given that both VDP and tax amnesties are voluntary compliance programmes, 
existing literature on tax amnesty are very relevant to this study and will be reviewed 
in this chapter. Firstly, this chapter will establish the characteristics of tax amnesty, 
then the reasons for tax amnesty implementation, followed by the effects of tax 





2.2 Characteristics of Tax Amnesty 
It is important to understand the characteristics of a tax amnesty. Luitel and Sobel 
(2007) explains that the three most important characteristics of tax amnesty are firstly, 
tax amnesty is short term in nature and lasts from two months to one year. Secondly, 
participation in a tax amnesty is voluntary whereby tax payers (evaders) may decide 
not to participate. Thirdly, an amnesty programme only waives the penalties or 
interest related to tax evasion but do not remit the principal amount of tax that is due.  
Previously, Franzoni (1996) has classified amnesty into three types as follows: 
 Return amnesty: the opportunity given to taxpayers to correct their tax return 
with reduced penalty but not immune from enforcement activities (audit and 
investigation) of tax administrators; 
 Investigation amnesty: an offer not to investigate the actual amount of tax 
payable if taxpayers take part in amnesty programme; and  
 Prosecution amnesty:  nullify legal liability of taxpayer whereby tax 
administration will suspend their prosecution powers.  
Among the three types, return amnesty has been extensively used by many countries 
including Malaysia. However, tax administrators are constantly formulating new 
types of amnesty programme in combination of return, investigation and prosecution 
amnesty. 
 
According to Alm and Rath (1998), the eligibility criteria for tax amnesty is essential 
and usually tax administrators will not only targeting potential tax payers who are not 





that existing tax payers are paying the correct amount of tax due to government. 
Further, tax amnesty can be applied to all types of taxes including corporate and 
individual income tax, sales and use tax and property tax (Alm & Rath, 1998).  
 
Marchese (2014) said that tax amnesties should be granted only to taxpayers who are 
not yet investigated such as taxpayers who failed to file returns on time or those 
submit incorrect returns by understating the revenue or overstating of expenses. 
Similarly, Friedman and Palmer (2010) in his review on Canada VDP has highlighted 
that amnesty disclosures will not be considered to be voluntary if a taxpayer was 
selected for audit or investigation activities. Nevertheless, some countries has loosen 
this rules whereby amnesties are applicable to all taxpayer including those under audit 
and investigation activities. For example, Malaysian VDP in 2015 and 2016 offered 
discounted penalty rate to both voluntary disclosures and audit or investigation 
settlements (EY, 2016). Sanchez Villalba (2017) warns that forgiving evaders already 
known as delinquents may lead to negative compliance in long term as the act suggest 
that the tax authority does not consider tax evasion a serious offence.  
 
On the other hand, the timing of amnesty implementation is a crucial part in 
determining the effectiveness of the programme.  This is because the duration of the 
programme, extension period (if any) and the frequency of the programme will clearly 
affect the results i.e. the outcome of the tax amnesty programme offered by the tax 







2.3 Reasons for Tax Amnesty Implementation 
One of the main rationales given by tax administrators (governments) to justify their 
tax amnesty programme is to generate additional revenue besides increasing future tax 
base by identifying tax evaders. However, literatures on tax amnesty studies revealed 
that both economic and political reasons can influence the decision to introduce a tax 
amnesty or VDP. 
 
Parle and Hirlinger (1986) is one of the earliest study that addressing the reasons that 
lead to tax amnesty implementation. Based on the analysis of 13 state amnesties in 
United Sates, the study proposes the following reasons for the occurrence of tax 
amnesties;  
 To collect outstanding taxes with minimum cost which otherwise become 
uncollectable due to limited enforcement activities; 
 To promote compliance level among citizens; and  
 To bring individuals outside the tax rolls and thus, not easily detectable to the 
revenue system. 
 
Later, Chugh (1987) via his survey studies among tax commissioners who has 
participated in tax amnesty implementation has derived another three reasons for 
offering tax amnesty. Firstly, to provide an opportunity to correct their mistakes or 
evasion before stricter laws take effect. Secondly, to create awareness of tax evasion 






Reasons for implementing tax amnesty programme has also been investigated by 
Dubin, Graetz and Wilde (1992) of which they reported purely economic factors that 
influence decision to run a tax amnesty programme for the period of 1980 to 1988. 
They found that the most important reason for implementing tax amnesty is the 
expected yield while fiscal stress is not an important factor.  
 
Mahestyanti, Juanda and Anggraeni (2018) stated that the government of Indonesia 
chose to introduce tax amnesty programme in 2016 because Indonesia has low tax 
compliance and the need to source additional revenue for infrastructure development. 
However, as documented by Indonesian Finance Ministry said that the main purpose 
of the programme is to bring back local residents asset invested in foreign countries to 
boost economic growth. In other words, illicit financial flows are the major target for 
tax amnesty programme by the Government.  
 
In relation to the timing of tax amnesty implementation, in the United States (US), 
Borgne (2006) reported that probability of declaring amnesties are higher during 
fiscal stress periods whereas the probability is lower during a year when elections are 
going to be held. In other words, his study revealed that tax amnesty programmes will 
not be implemented if elections are around the corner. This is because law abiding 
voters (i.e. those paying correct amount of taxes on time) will perceive tax amnesty 
programme as ‘unfair’ since the programme is rewarding the tax evaders with a lower 
effective tax rate (Rechberger et.al., 2010). The political determinant of tax amnesty 
implementation has been further evidenced by Saracoglu and Caskurlu (2011) in his 





because of political reasons and tax amnesty following each election does support his 
findings. 
 
Schmittdiel (2015) suggest that when parts of the populations feel more or less guilty 
about evading taxes after reports are due, tax authorities would always like to offer a 
voluntary disclosure programme. However, “guilt” feeling among populations is very 
subjective and the most difficult part to describe or measure. The study did not 
elaborate further on how tax authorities measure this subjective feeling among 
populations. According to Baer and Borgne (2008), tax amnesties also sometimes 
offered in periods of economic crisis, when there is a fear that tax payers may be 
unable to meet their various tax liabilities, when there are major currency 
devaluations, or when there is a change of government. Another justification quoted 
by Marchese (2014) for implementing tax amnesty programme is when special 
circumstances arises in a country such as major political regime change, drastic 
changes in currency or significant reforms in tax law. This major upheavals may 
motivate unwanted breaches of law or mistakes by taxpayers. Thus, tax amnesty will 
be introduced to overcome the said problems that may arise. 
 
In addition to the above reasons, International Monetary Fund (IMF) found that 
inefficiency of tax administrations also can lead to frequent tax amnesty programmes 
as documented by Baer and Borgne (2008). They outlined some of the weaknesses in 
tax authorities that can give rise to tax amnesties as follows: 
 Lack of a fair interest and penalty regime whereas the penalty or interest rates 





 Limited ability of the tax administration to obtain tax payer related 
information (e.g. access to third party or bank information); 
 Non-existence of a well-designed and fair instalment payment system; 
 Absence of tax administration power to enforce collections (e.g. seize bank 
accounts and physical assets) and reliance by the tax administration on the 
courts;  
 Lack of tax administration powers to “write off” what considers to be 
uncollectible tax debts; and 
 Abuse of the appeals system to postpone payment of tax arrears. Tax payers 
easily interrupt collection enforcement actions via recourse to the appeals 
system.  
 
2.4 The Effects of Tax Amnesty Implementation 
Most of the published empirical research studies conducted on tax amnesty have 
addressed two important effects of an amnesty programme which is the impact on tax 
revenue and future tax compliance. 
 
2.4.1 Revenue Effects 
The ability of amnesty programmes to generate additional revenues is an essential part 
to be examined. Fisher et.al. (1989) pointed out that amnesty seems to generate 
immediate revenue efficiently but long term revenue gains are likely to be small 
because amnesties are not particularly effective in identifying all tax evaders. 
Christian et.al (2002) concluded that although on aggregate an estimated 5,500 





from these taxpayers are negligible which is about 0.1% from total revenue collected. 
Besides that, Hasseldine (1998) has reviewed 43 tax amnesty programmes in the US 
and concluded that amnesties only contribute around 0.008% to 2% of total tax 
revenues. 
 
Wang and Hsieh (2015) has examined the effect of tax amnesty on tax revenue and 
revealed that during the initial assessment period of the tax amnesty plan, revenue 
hugely increased. However, tax revenue stably declined when the assessment period 
ends and ultimately converged on a fixed value. This is because the probability that 
taxpayers are exempt from fines and successfully evade taxes increase after an 
amnesty. In other words, secondary tax evasion is often accompanied by tax amnesty. 
Subsequent amnesties generate less revenues compared to initial tax amnesty 
programmes (Luitel & Sobel, 2007).  
 
Similarly, the key result of the study conducted by Schmittdiel (2015) states that 
government revenue not only rises with surprise VDP, but even when such a 
programme is anticipated.  Their analysis agreed with the existing literature that 
anticipated amnesty programme initially lead to more tax evasion but estimate a 
positive relationship with revenue growth. The reason for this is that offering an 
anticipated programme allows the tax payers to adjust their decisions on withholding 
taxes to their relevant guilt parameters once they are known. This yields more revenue 
than a situation where taxpayers have to base their decisions on their expectations of 






Contrary to the above findings, Alm and Beck (1993) and Alm, Martines and Wallace 
(2009) concluded that tax amnesties programme has no effect on revenue. In their 
empirical work with field data, Almand Beck (1993) analyzed the long-run effects of 
the Coroloda tax amnesty programme for the period of January 1982 to December 
1989. Their time-series analysis indicates that long term effect of amnesty on gross 
revenue collection is unclear and probably nil or negative.  
 
Since most of the evidence on relationship between amnesties and revenue collection 
is examined in the United State, Alm, Martines and Wallace (2009) using a range of 
structural and time series methods, concluded that Russian amnesties unlikely to have 
had significant positive or negative impacts on the revenues of the Russian 
Federation.  
 
Based on the above studies, the revenue generating effects of tax amnesties are 
uncertain depending on the designation of the programme. However, most of the 
studies agreed that first time amnesties are able to yield a considerable amount of 
revenue compared to repeated amnesty programmes. 
 
2.4.2 Compliance Effects 
Increasing compliance is another ultimate objective of tax amnesty programme. 
Theoretically, tax amnesties should be able to identify tax offenders to settle their 





have addressed that compliance is not necessarily increasing following an amnesty 
due to various reasons. 
 
One of the initial reviews on tax amnesty by Leonard and Zeckhauser (1987) 
suggested that tax amnesty can increase future compliance by lowering its cost (i.e. no 
longer necessary to evade or to hide past bad behavior). However, subsequent studies 
showed that amnesties can have a negative impact on compliances. Alm, Mckee and 
Beck (1990) concluded that tax compliances decreases following a tax amnesty 
programme. However, they recommended that the compliance can be improved with 
an increased after tax amnesty enforcement such as frequent auditing and harsher tax 
penalties after tax amnesty.  
 
In agreement with Alm et.al. (1990), Saracoglu (2011) based on his study on tax 
amnesty in Turkey, foreseen that the main problem caused by tax amnesty is tax 
compliance prevention because honest tax payers started to see that tax amnesties as 
awards for tax dodgers and this significantly damages their tax compliance. The result 
is driven by a very weak and inefficient tax audit system in Turkey. Mattiello (2005) 
has stated that an amnesty which applied with a high commitment of not recurring 
will lead to a better compliance level.  The study also revealed that tax compliance 
will increase in short term when tax defaulters come forward to declare unreported 
income. These new taxpayers will be monitored by tax administrators for the 
following years in order to ensure they are fully complied. However, the study 
concludes compliance level will be decreased or lower in long term due to few 





are failed to collect taxes via enforcement activities such as auditing and penalties. 
The low auditing possibilities and expectation of amnesties might reduce the 
compliance level. Secondly, unfairness feeling of honest taxpayers towards tax 
amnesty can reduce their compliance level in the long run. 
 
Langenmay (2015) studied on voluntary disclosure programme in the United State 
also confirming the theoretical result that the introduction of voluntary disclosure 
leads to more tax evasion. The result was based on evaluating the implications of 
2009 VDP. They have analyzed the deposits of the United State residents in an 
aggregate of offshore banking centers for the year 2006, 2009 and 2012 to determine 
the effect of amnesties (before, during and after 2009 voluntary disclosure 
programme). Conversely, the empirical time-series analysis conducted by Alm and 
Beck (1993) indicates that tax amnesty seems unlikely to have significant negative 
effects on long run compliance behavior. The outcome is based on amnesty 
programme in the state of Corolada whereby amnesty itself was of such small size 
that had no effect on compliance decisions. Post amnesty compliance level severely 
depends on how the amnesty programmes are designed and the frequency of such 
programmes. A one-time amnesty programme followed by harsher enforcement 
activities will positively contribute to overall compliance level. Further, information 
disclosed by participants can be used to increase future tax base. 
 
To conclude, there are different opinion and evidences on long term compliances of 
tax amnesty. Most of the studies believes that a well-planned one time amnesty can 





2.5 Reasons to Participate in VDP 
Despite evidences that tax amnesties are moderately effective tax revenue collection 
strategies (Fisher et.al. 1989: Alm and Beck, 1993), not all amnesty programmes 
raised considerable tax revenue due to poor responses from tax payers (tax evaders). 
Short-term revenues crucially dependence on whether a significant number of 
taxpayers chose to take part in amnesties or not. However, majority of studies on tax 
amnesty did not state the reasons for taxpayer participation.  
 
The first reason for an individual to participate in amnesty programme is the fear of 
detection and punishment (Alm, 1990). In this regard, an efficient tax audit and 
investigation system of tax administrators will contribute to higher participation 
towards tax amnesty as tax payers are afraid of getting audited. In view of that, 
creating a strong impression that enforcement measures are being enhanced is an 
important factor to encourage amnesty participation. Fisher et.al. (1989) also 
classified amnesty participant characteristics as “those who perceive a large increase 
in the likelihood that past evasion will be detected or penalties to be imposed”.  
 
However, contrary to the above findings, as argued by Wang and Hsieh (2015) and 
Bayer, Oberhofer and Winner (2014), detection probability and post amnesty 
enforcement level have no relation to amnesty participation. Wang and Hsieh (2015) 
study showed that tax evaders are willing to participate in tax amnesty plans despite 
the probability of the exogenous variables i.e. ‘penalty rate’ and ‘probability of tax 





forward looking tax payer, who discounts future taxes and fines, might take up an 
amnesty even if the enforcement parameters remain unchanged.   
 
Another reason of amnesty participation is strategic delinquency as documented by 
Ross and Buckwalter (2013). They estimated that the reason account for between 4.3 
and 16.5 percent of the United State tax amnesty. Taxpayer delaying tax payment 
until an amnesty programme declared in order to realize some interest gains. The 
basis for this act is differences between the individually faced interest rate and the 
interest rate during tax amnesty. 
 
The size of penalty reduction or incentives provided under an amnesty is another 
reason for taxpayers to come forward voluntarily during tax amnesty period. If the 
total tax liability with penalty (i.e. cost of settlement) is higher than the value of the 
asset, the taxpayer might not be motivated to participate in VDP or amnesty 
programmes (OECD, 2015). Size of penalty also appeared to be an influential 
motivation in taxpayer’s amnesty decision-making reported by Farrar and 
Hausserman (2016). Similarly, Mahestyanti, Juanda and Anggraeni (2018) has 
concluded that tax amnesty participation in Indonesia is highest during the first three 
months where the tariff rates offered was the lowest. This indicates that taxpayers 
prefer to participate when tax amnesty comes with the lowest rate. 
 
Fear of further audit may discourage tax payers from the voluntary disclosures. 
OECD (2015) mentioned that many taxpayers concern that a disclosure will give rise 





risk of future audit and investigation. Thus, OECD advised that tax administrators 
must made public that disclosures during tax amnesties or VDP will not affect future 
compliance activity. Marchese (2014) stressed that auditing powers should be limited 
or excluded in order to boost participation in tax amnesties. The study also mentioned 
that amnesties should assuage taxpayer fears that further audit will be conducted if a 
specific tax base is disclosed.  
 
Guilt cognitions also a reason for the decision to participate in tax amnesty 
programmes. The impact of guilt on tax amnesty disclosure decision has been 
examined by Farrar et al. (2014). The likelihood of a tax payer making an amnesty 
disclosure is greatest when the individual assumes personal responsibility for the 
transgression, can justify the transgression, and can foresee the negative consequences 
arising from the transgression. In fact, personal responsibilities played an important 
role to ensure that tax payers come forward to admit their mistake.   
 
Marketing campaign played an important role as a medium to informing taxpayers the 
available opportunity. The importance of marketing or publicity of tax amnesty 
programme has been documented by Mikesell (1984); Mikesell (1986); Parle and 
Hirlinger (1986); Ross and Buckwalter (2013) and Ross (2012). Publication efforts by 
tax administrators are believed to be an essential part to make an amnesty a successful 
programme. Parle and Hirlinger (1986) explained that publicity should provide a 
positive view of the programme with clear goals of its implementation and must 






Another reason for taxpayer participation in tax amnesty is international 
opportunities. Good economic growth with liberalization policies and opening of 
international trade also provide motivation for firms to participate in amnesties. The 
reason is that, they can benefit more in the new environment if they are legal and have 
a clean tax record (Marchese, 2014). Without a clean tax record, it is very difficult to 
access to credit and export market. Therefore, amnesty programmes will attract those 
tax evaders who wish to expand their business internationally. Similarly, Bose and 
Jetter (2012) also emphasize that if there is a positive and significant impact of 
globalization to taxpayer income, tax amnesty will be successful because tax amnesty 
will be an opportunity to legalise their business activities.  
 
It should be noted that not everyone who files for an amnesty is a tax evader. Even 
honest taxpayers may fear having made mistakes on their return unintentionally and 
want to avoid being audited. In these cases, amnesties can appeal to honest tax payers 
(Marchese, 2014). These amnesty disclosures or VDP is an opportunity for compliant 
taxpayers to correct any unintentional omission or errors in their previous 
submissions.  
 
For the purpose of this study, besides the literature review, all factors related to 
taxpayer participation have been discussed with tax experts i.e. senior IRBM officers 
and tax practitioners. Based on the discussion, the most relevant factors to Malaysian 
taxation system and environment have been chosen to be studied in detail. The factors 
are size of penalty reduction, fear of detection and punishment, risk of further audit 





2.6 Tax Professionals’ Perceptions 
Marshall, Smith and Armstrong (2006) has defined tax professionals as a diverse 
group of individuals and professional groups who provide a wide range of tax services 
including self-employed and in-house accountants, licensed tax agents, franchises of 
tax firms as well as legal practitioners in taxation (tax lawyers). Tax professionals 
play an important role in revenue collection process under self-assessment system. 
Most of the taxpayers rely on tax professionals to fulfill their tax obligations towards 
government. Tax professionals are assigned to submit tax returns on behalf of their 
clients (taxpayers). Hence, tax professional’s opinion on any tax issues pertaining to 
taxpayer is significant and reliable. In view of this, numerous studies on tax issues has 
been conducted relying on perception from tax professionals. 
 
Sapiei and Kasipillai (2013) has obtained the views of external tax professionals to 
study the compliance behaviour of corporations as tax professionals are deemed to 
have knowledge on taxpayer compliance attitude. Similarly, Benk, Cakmak and 
Budak (2012) sought the perceptions of tax professionals in assessing tax fairness in 
Turkey. Their justification was because tax professionals possess the required 
knowledge to evaluate tax policies and systems. 
 
Another study focuses on perceptions of tax professional is Takril and Sanusi (2014) 
which examined tax practitioners perception on aggressive tax avoidance. They found 
that tax practitioners perceived aggressive tax avoidance as unethical behavior.  
Similarly, Borrego, Lopes and Ferreira (2016) conducted a study on perceptions of 





highly complex. Abdul Manaf, Mat Udin, Ishak and Abdul Rahman (2013) also used 
tax professional’s perception to evaluate the services provided by IRBM. The 
comments from tax professionals towards the tax authority are important to improve 
the quality of services provided by IRBM.  
 
Apart from the studies discussed above, there are still many more studies on taxation 
which are relying on perception of tax professionals in order to derive a reliable 
outcome. In view of that, for the purpose of this exploratory study, tax professionals’ 
perceptions have been obtained to identify reasons for VDP participation in Malaysia 
on the following grounds: 
 Tax professionals are in better position to understand the research question 
because the term VDP might not be familiar among taxpayers; 
 Any voluntary disclosures will be submitted via tax agents (professionals) to 
IRBM. Therefore, tax professionals are well aware of taxpayers’ reason to 
participate or not to participate in VDP; and 
 Tax professionals have the responsibility to communicate VDP implemented by 
tax administrators to their client. 
 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter reviewed the related literature on tax amnesties and VDP. Although all 
of the studies are carried out outside Malaysia, it provides a deep understanding on 
the concept of VDP. The understanding is essential to explore the reasons for taxpayer 









This chapter outlines research method that has been adopted in this exploratory study 
which aims to gain a deeper understanding about Malaysian taxpayer participation in 
VDP. This section includes a brief discussion on conceptual framework, research 
instruments, population, sample determination, data collection and data analysis. 
 
3.2 Conceptual Framework 
A conceptual framework is a structure which the researcher believes can best explain 
the natural progression of the phenomenon to be studied (Camp, 2001). For the 
purpose of this exploratory study, a conceptual framework has been developed based 






Figure 3.1: Proposed Conceptual Framework for Reasons Contribute to VDP  





















3.3 Operational Definition 
This section provides operational definition of the reasons included in the conceptual 
framework of the current study. The first reason, size of penalty reduction referred to 
the amount of reduction in penalty rate during VDP against the concessionary rates 
stipulated in tax audit framework. Next, fear of detection and punishment refers to 
behavioral predictions on the probability of detection and the fine on detected evasion 
by IRBM. Third reason, risk of further audit means the probability that disclosures 
during VDP subject to detailed audit by IRBM. Finally, promotion efforts by IRBM 
refers to the publication initiatives taken by IRBM to promote the VDP among 
taxpayer especially tax defaulters.  
 
3.4 Research Design 
According to Crotty (1998), the choice of research design depends on the purpose of 
the study and it must be able to answer all research questions. Apart from that, 
research design also significant as it will determine the type of analysis to interpret the 
data obtained. In order to address the research question effectively, this study used a 
quantitative exploratory descriptive design to identify, analyses and describe reasons 
that contribute to taxpayer participation in VDP from the perspective of tax 
professionals.  
 
This study is exploratory in nature because it is considers as the first attempt to 
examine reasons for VDP participation in Malaysia. According to Brink and Wood 
(1998), an exploratory study is what has not really been examined previously which 





meanings and explore the factors associated to the topic. In addition, this study is 
descriptive in nature. A descriptive study attempts to provide the perceptions and 
views of the respondents about the problem studied (Burns & Grove, 1993). Besides 
that, descriptive study does not answer questions about ‘why’ and ‘how’ but typically 
answer questions about ‘what is’ or ‘what was’ (Bickman & Rog, 1998). Uys and 
Basson (1991) explained that the typical characteristics of an ‘exploratory descriptive’ 
research design are as follows:  
i. It is a flexible research design which enables the researcher to study all aspects 
of the problem; 
ii. It attempts to develop new knowledge;  
iii. The information (data) obtained may lead to new hypothesis for future 
researches; and 
iv. It is usually a field study in a natural setting 
 
In order to understand the perception and opinion from a group of tax professionals, 
who are knowledgeable and experienced in the field of Malaysian taxation, the study 
opted for a quantitative approach, self-administered questionnaire survey which is 
cost effective and capable to gather information in a short period of time.  This is in 
line with the suggestions by researchers, for instance, survey method is used to assess 
public opinion or characteristics of individuals via sampling methods and 
questionnaires (McBurney, 1994). Survey also has been considered as the most 
effective tool to present the opinions, ideas and views of a larger population (Sekaran 





this exploratory study as it simplifies data analysis and relatively easy to conduct with 
minimum cost. 
 
3.5 Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire employed in this study was self-developed in such a way that 
enables respondents to answer the questions accurately and easily. In order to develop 
the items for each reason, in person consultation had been carried out with three tax 
experts who has been working in the field of taxation for more than 10 years.  
 
The questionnaire is divided into three sections. Section I, as shown in Table 3.1, 
deals with demographic background and experience on VDP which consisted of 
questions on gender, age, qualification, location, working experience and VDP 
experiences. Section II incorporates assessment on factors contributing to VDP 
participation. The total number of questions has been minimized in order to keep the 
survey short and simple which aims to get higher response rate.  Based on the tax 
experts consultation as mentioned earlier, three questions were designated to examine 
each reason which in total consisting of 12 questions with 5-point Likert Scale to give 
respondents a more expressive options. Respondents were instructed to mark the most 
suitable answer in which the scores range from 1-5 as follows: 
1= Strongly Disagree,  
2= Disagree,  
3= Neutral,  
4= Agree,  





The questions for four reasons, namely, size of penalty reduction, fear of detection and 
punishment, risk of further audit and promotion efforts by IRBM are presented in 
Table 3.2 as below; 
 
Table 3.1 






1. The size of penalty reduction is important in VDP   
     implementation. 
2. Current penalty structure offered by IRBM for VDP is failed  
     to influence more taxpayers to participate. 
3. VDP in Malaysia will be more effective if the size of penalty  








1.  The probability to detect mistakes/omissions by IRBM is  
low. 
2.  Taxpayers who have greater fear of detection will likely to   
     participate in VDP. 
3.  Taxpayers will participate in VDP if IRBM enforcement  







1. IRBM will further audit the voluntary disclosures submitted  
     by taxpayers in VDP. 
2. The fear of further audit discourages taxpayers from  
     participating in VDP. 
3.  If IRBM accepts the disclosures made by taxpayers without  







1.  VDP has been promoted intensively to taxpayers. 
2. Taxpayers are well aware of VDP implemented by IRBM. 
3. IRBM should increase promotion of the VDP in order to   










3.6 Pretesting and Pilot Testing 
Chen, Paulraj and Lado (2004) suggested that questionnaires need to be pre-tested 
before data collection process to validate the contents. Therefore, the questionnaire 
has been distributed to tax experts (professionals and academics) to ensure the 
understandability of the statements and its relevance to research question. Their 
suggestions and amendments on wordings has been incorporated in the final draft.  
 
Besides pre-testing, pilot test is significant in an exploratory research to ensure the 
clarity and validity of the questionnaires. Therefore, a pilot test was conducted before 
initiating the actual survey. The final drafts of the questionnaire were distributed to 25 
selected senior level IRBM auditors who are experienced in handling VDP cases and 
21 has been completed and returned. Positive feedback has been given by the pilot 
test respondents. 
 
According to Connelly (2008), extant literature suggests that a pilot test sample 
should be 10% of the sample projected for the larger parent study. On the other hand, 
Isaac and Michael (1995) and Hill (1998) have suggested 10 – 30 participants for a 
pilot study in survey research. In view of that, 21 samples is acceptable for the 
purpose of pilot test in this study which is more than 10% of the targeted sample size.  
 
Reliability test was conducted on the 21 pilot test returned questionnaires which 
shows Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients within the range of 0.5 to 0.8 for all the four 





as there are different opinions. Although Kubiszyn and Borich (2000) suggested that 
Cronbach’s Alpha value within the 0.80 to 0.90 is acceptable, Ghazali (2008) pointed 
out the value of 0.6 is acceptable in social sciences. Ideally, the Cronbach’s Alpha 
above 0.50 will be acceptable if the number of questions is small (Tamir, 2008). In 




Pilot Study Reliability Test Results (n=21) 
Reasons No. of Item  Cronbach’s Alpha  
Size of Penalty Reduction 
 
3 0.606 














Promotion Efforts by IRBM 0.523  
 
 
3.7 Population of the Study 
Patton (2002) has defined target populations as group of persons, objects or 
institutions that accurately describes the objects of the research study. In this study, 
the population was tax professionals in Malaysia including registered tax agents, tax 
preparers, tax accountants, in-house tax accountants and self-employed. The 
definition of tax professional or tax practitioner has been adapted from previous 







3.7.1 The Eligibility Criteria 
Polit and Hungler (1999) stated that eligibility criteria specify the characteristics that 
must be possessed by the population in order to eligible as participants. The eligibility 
criteria for this study is participants must have been working in the field of Malaysian 
taxation, specifically preparing tax returns and providing tax related advices to their 
clients (taxpayers).  
 
3.8 Sampling Method 
Purposive sampling method has been adopted for the purpose of this study which 
enables the researcher to apply own judgment to identify samples. Morse and 
Richards (2002) stated that purposive samples are chosen based on its ability to 
address the research questions being asked in the study whereas Polit and Beck (2004) 
suggested that newly incorporated questionnaires will be evaluated effectively via 
purposive sampling especially when the researcher prefers a sample of experts. Tax 
professionals from big four tax firms in Klang Valley and Johor Bahru have been 
identified using purposive sampling. This is because they are handling with highest 
number of clients and well aware of tax policies and programmes implemented by 
IRBM. For example, Ernst and Young Malaysia has issued an article, namely, Tax 
Amnesty: Reduction and Waiver of Tax Penalties (Ernst & Young, 2016) which 
shows that tax practitioners are playing a pivotal role to help businesses understand 








3.9 Data Collection 
Another important process in research design is data collection because the method 
employed will determines the reliability of the data. The questionnaires (after pilot 
testing and appropriate modifications) were distributed to all big four tax firms in 
Johor Bahru and Kuala Lumpur during the period of January - May 2018. The longer 
period (5 months) are due to the process involved in data collection. Head of tax 
department at KPMG, Ernst and Young, Pwc and Deloitte in Kuala Lumpur and Johor 
Bahru were contacted to get permission to distribute questionnaire to all staff in their 
department and a sample of questionnaire has been emailed as per their request. After 
reviewing the questionnaires, approval for distribution was given via email or 
telephone. Thereafter, questionnaires were distributed based on staff population in 
respective tax departments and 135 questionnaires has been successfully completed 
and returned.  
 
3.10 Data Analysis Techniques 
Data collected were compiled, coded, categorized and input into the Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 21. There are three analyses which have 
been carried out in this study. Firstly, the reliability analysis was conducted to 
validate the accuracy and reliability of the questionnaire. Secondly, the validity 
analysis was conducted to measure the validity of the items in the questionnaire. 
According to Sekaran and Bougie (2010), it is important for the research instruments 
to be approved using validity analysis. Thirdly, the descriptive analysis was 







Chapter three illustrated the proposed research design for this study together with the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
explanation on the survey method, data collection method, population and sample 
selection, questionnaire design, pilot testing and proposed data analysis techniques. 
Pilot study was conducted on 21 samples and the results are acceptable. Meanwhile, a 
total of 135 questionnaires has been completed and returned for further analysis. The 


































DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter represents the prime focus of the study which addresses the research 
question. It mainly discusses the analysis conducted on the data obtained from self-
administered questionnaires which were completed by tax professionals. In order to 
present the analysis effectively, this chapter has been divided into seven sections, 
namely, response rate validity, of respondents profile, data screening, assessment of 
normality, reliability analysis, factoring analysis and descriptive statistics analysis as 
illustrated in figure 4.1.   
 
 
Figure 4.1: Overview of Data Analysis 
 
4.2 Response Rate 
Response rate is considered as a significant measure of validity whereby AAPOR 
(1997) recognized response rate as one of the important reporting elements for an 
exemplary survey research. In view of that, this section will present the response rate 
statistic for this study. Overall, the response rate of 84.4% as shown in table 4.1 is 








 Number % 
Questionnaires Distribute  160 100 
Questionnaires Returned 





(-) Incomplete Questionnaires  - - 
Usable Questionnaire  135 84.4 
 
 
4.3 Respondents Profile 
A total of 135 respondents have participated in the survey and their demographic 
profile analysis is shown in Table 4.2. The respondents profile includes a total of 135 
tax professionals who took part in this study. Among them, male respondents were 39 
while 96 were female and percentage of these respondents is 28.9% and 71.1% 
respectively. Majority of the respondents i.e. 66 tax professionals aged between 20-30 
years. As a certified tax professional, majority of respondents have first degree as 
their highest qualification except three of them with diploma qualification. A total of 
85 of them hold degree while professional qualification holders were 45 and masters 
holders were two respondents. Table 4.2 also shows that more than half of the 
respondents (53.3%) are from Johor Bahru and the rest are from Kuala Lumpur 
(46.7%). In term of working experience, a majority of respondents (51%) stated that 
they have been in the field for a period of 1 to 5 years meanwhile around 17% of them 
having working experience from 5 to 10 years. The rest of them, 31%, had more than 
10 years of experience in taxation. In total 48 surveyed have experienced in handling 
VDP cases however, a larger population, 87 of them equivalent to 64.4 % had never 







Demographic Information Frequency Percentage  
1.  Gender  
          Male 39 28.9  
          Female 96 71.1  
Total 135 100.0  
2.  Age    
          20 – 30 66 48.9  
          31 – 40  47 34.8  
          41 and Above 22 16.3  
Total 135 100.0  
3.  Qualification  
          Diploma 3 2.2  
          Degree 85 63.0  
   Professional Qualification 45 33.3  
          Masters / PhD 2 1.5  
Total 135 100.0  
4.  Location  
          Johor Bahru 72 53.3  
          Kuala Lumpur 63 46.7  
Total 135 100.0  
6.  Working Experience  
          1 – 5 years 69       51.1  
          6 – 10 years 24       17.8  
          11 – 15 years 23       17.0  
          16 – 20 years  14 10.4  
          21 years & above 5 3.7  
Total 135 100.0  
7.  Handle VDP Case  
          YES 48 35.6  
          NO 87 64.4  
Total   135 100.0  
 
 
4.4 Data Screening 
This is the first step in data analysis which is known as pre-analysis stage. Prior to 
data analysis and data recoding process, it is essential to check the data for correctness 
and other errors. Data screening process is including checking for error, finding and 






For the purpose of this study, 135 usable questionnaires were screened carefully and 
no error is found. This may due to the background of respondents who are 
professional and highly committed to answer all the questions properly. Apart from 
that, the presence of outliers also has been tested as part of data screening process. No 
outliers were detected as well.  
 
4.5 Normality Assessment 
Normality assessment is a prerequisite for any statistical procedures. Gravetter and 
Wallnau (2000) has defined normal distribution as symmetrical with bell shaped 
curve, whereby scores with the highest frequency will appear at the middle and scores 
with minimum frequency will be located towards the extremes.   
 
There are many ways to test normality of data distribution including graphical and 
statistical examination. For the purpose of this study, the following statistical 
techniques were conducted to determine the normality of data distribution: 
 Statistical Analysis of Normality : Skewness and Kurtosis 
 Graphical Analysis of Normality: Histograms and Quantile-Quantile Plots 
 
4.5.1 Statistical Analysis of Normality - Skewness and Kurtosis 
Although many statistical methods are available to test normality, Skewness and 
Kurtosis of the distribution deemed to be suitable to measure data normality as it is 






George and Mallary (2006) defined Skewness as an indicator that reflects to what 
extent distribution of data is symmetrical. Skewness value of zero asserts a perfectly 
normal distribution whereas outside the range of +1 to -1 implies a strong deviation 
from normality (Hair et. al., 2006). Based on the figures in Table 4.1, skewness values 
for all variables in this study are within the range of +1 to -1, hence normal 
distribution can be assumed. 
 
Meanwhile, Kurtosis value measures the flatness or peachiness of data distribution. 
Although George and Mallery (2006) suggested that kurtosis value between +1 and -1 
is considered normal distribution, Coakes and Steed (2003) mentioned that kurtosis 
values are acceptable within +3 and -3. Therefore, the kurtosis values for variables in 
this study which ranges 0.789 to 1.321 as illustrated in Table 4.3 is assumed to be 
normally distributed.   
 
Table 4.3 
Summary of Skewness and Kurtosis Value of the Variables 
Reasons Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
Size of Penalty Reduction -0.773 0.209 0.789 0.414 
Fear of Detection & Punishment -0.426 0.209 1.406 0.414 
Risk of Further Audit -0.985 0.209 1.315 0.414 









4.5.2 Graphical analysis of Normality: Histograms and Quantile-Quantile Plots 
Figure 4.2 to 4.5 displays the histograms and corresponding Q-Q plots for all the 
variables studied in this research paper. The bell-shaped curves, called normal curves, 


















Figure 4.3: Histogram with Bell Curve and Normal Q-Q plot for Fear of Detection & 













Figure 4.4: Histogram with Bell Curve and Normal Q-Q plot for Risk of Further   










Figure 4.5: Histogram with Bell Curve and Normal Q-Q plot for Promotion Efforts   






4.6 Reliability Analysis 
Reliability is an extent to which multiple measurements of an instrument consistently 
measure what it intends to measure (Creswell, 2014). In simple terms, it refers to the 
extent to which the same scores can be obtained using the same questionnaire for 
more than one time.  For the purpose of this study, Cronbach’s Alpha has been used 
to assess the internal consistency of the items in each variable and the results are 
presented in Table 4.4. 
  
Table 4.4 
Reliability Analysis of Variables (n=135) 
Variables No. of items Cronbach’s Alpha 
Size of Penalty Reduction 3 0.734 
Fear of Detection & Punishment 3 0.872 
Risk of Further Audit 3 0.812 
Promotion efforts by IRBM 3 0.841 
 
 
As Table 4.5 shows, the variable ‘Fear of Detection and Punishment’ has the highest 
Cronbach’s Alpha, as high as 0.872 whereas ‘Size of Penalty Reduction’ has the 
lowest score, as low as 0.734.The acceptable level of Cronbach’s Alpha is arguable as 
there are different opinions among researchers. Kubiszyn and Borich (2000) 
suggested that Cronbach’s Alpha within the range of 0.80 to 0.90 is acceptable 
whereas Ghazali (2008) pointed out that value of 0.6 is considered as reliable in 
social sciences. Ideally, Cronbach’s Alpha above 0.50 also endorsed in cases where 
the number of question is small (Cockburn et.al., 1991; Tamir, 2008). Therefore, 
since the minimum reliability scores in this study is above 0.7, it can be concluded 





4.7 Validity Test 
Factor analysis is the medium commonly used to test validity of instruments in 
research studies. It will provide construct validity evidence of self-reporting scales 
and helps to reduce the huge number of questions into few factors (variables) 
according to their interrelationship. Costello and Osborne (2005) mentioned that 
factor analysis measures how good a research model with specific amount of factors 
accounts for the variance between a dataset. Two statistical measures has been 
performed to determine the factorability of data as follows: 
 The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO), a statistic that indicates the amount of variance 
in the variables which might be caused by the underlying constructs (factors). 
 Bartlett’s test of sphericity, a statistic that tests the null hypothesis whether the 
original correlation matrix is an identity matrix. 
 
Pallant (2007) has recommended that minimum KMO index value for a good factor 
analysis is 0.60 while Bartlett’s sphericity test should be significant (P<0.05) for a 
reliable factor analysis. The results of the KMO and Bartlett’s sphericity test for all 
the variables are demonstrated in Table 4.6. It should be noted that KMO values for 
all variables are above 0.650 which exceeds the suggested minimum value of 0.60. 
Meanwhile, Bartlett’s sphericity test values for all variables are statistically 
significant (P=.000). The result also shows that total variance explained for all factors 
are ranging from 63.18% to 69.71% which is deemed to be good. Stevens (2002) 
indicates that a decent model should have at least 50% of the variance in the variables 
explained by factors. Given all these statistical evidences, the instrument used is 



















Size of Penalty Reduction 3 1 0.676 69.71 
Fear of detection and 
Punishment 
3 1 0.688 67.59 
Risk of Further Audit 3 1 0.651 63.18 
Promotion Efforts by IRBM 3 1 0.642 63.71 
 
 
On top of that, Table 4.6 reports the Rotated Component Matrix in factor analysis to 
interpret categories or reasons of all items measured in this study on the basis of 
Varimax Rotation with Kaiser Normalisation. To identify the items related to each 
reason, the items with the maximum value in each row is selected to be part of the 
respective reason. The highest values have been stated in each of the rows to group 
the 12 items into 4 reasons. The results ensure construct validity of the measurement 
for all four reasons and confirm the items used to measure each reason are suitable 













Rotated Components Matrix (n=135) 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 
Penalty Reduction Important .782    
Penalty Structure Attractive .826    
VDP Effective If Size Reduction Higher .827    
Detect Mistakes Low  .789   
Greater Fear Participate  .849   
IRBM Enforcement Enhanced  .808   
Further Audit In VDP    .813 
Further Audit Discourage    .855 
If NO Further Audit More Taxpayers Will Participate    .647 
VDP Promoted Intensively to Taxpayers   .763  
Taxpayers Well Aware   .866  
IRBM Should Increase Promotion   .743  
 
 
4.8 Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive analysis are commonly used to explore and describe what the raw data 
indicates through various measurements such as mean, median, range, variance and 
standard deviation. The mean score will best explain the central tendency of the data 
collected. The response scale in this study instrument ranged from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), and thus a greater mean value indicates a strong 
agreement with particular criterion and vice versa. On the other hand, standard 
deviation will measure how focused or spread the data around the average (mean) and 
serves as a statistical measure of variation. The descriptive analysis for all the data 





4.8.1 Size of Penalty Reduction 
As clearly illustrated in Table 4.7, the mean score for all the items are above 4.00 
which indicate a good agreement with the statements. Respondents perceived that size 
of penalty reduction is significant in VDP implementation whereby current penalty 
structure offered by IRBM is not attractive to taxpayers. Ideally, they believe that 
VDP in Malaysia will be more successful if the penalty reduction is higher. 
Meanwhile a smaller standard deviation for all the statements indicate that the results 
are very close in value to the mean.  
 
Table 4.7 
Size of Penalty Reduction (n=135) 
No Reason/Items Min Max Mean Std. 
Deviation  
 Size of Penalty Reduction     
1 The Size of Penalty Reduction is 
Important in VDP Implementation. 
 
3 5 4.36 0.674 
2 Current Penalty Structure offered by 
IRBM for VDP failed to Influence 
more Taxpayers to Participate. 
 
1 5 4.07 0.745 
3 VDP in Malaysia will be more 
Effective if the size of Penalty 
Reduction is Higher. 
1 5 4.35 0.795 
 
 
4.8.2 Fear of Detection and Punishment 
Based on the results presented in Table 4.8, the mean value of 3.01 reveals that tax 
professionals maintain a neutral perspective when the question is dealing with the 
probability of omission/error detection by IRBM. However, mean value above 3.5 for 





although tax professionals are unsure on detection probability by IRBM, they believes 
that enhancement of enforcement activities by IRBM will influence more tax payers 
to come forward to participate in VDP due to the fear of detection and punishment. 
Besides that, a smaller standard deviations of less than 1 for all the items indicates 
that more of the data is clustered about the mean. 
 
Table 4.8 
Fear of Detection and Punishment (n=135) 
No Reason/Items Min Max Mean Std. 
Deviation  
 Fear of Detection and Punishment     
1 The Probability to Detect 
Mistakes/Omissions by IRBM is Low 
. 
1 5 3.01 0.617 
2 Taxpayers who have Greater Fear of 
Detection will likely to Participate in 
VDP. 
 
1 5 3.82 0.818 
3 Taxpayers will Participate in VDP if 
IRBM Enforcement Activities are 
Enhanced. 
1 5 3.79 0.793 
 
 
4.8.3 Risk of Further Audit 
The mean value of 4.00 and above for all the items as per in Table 4.9 evident that 
risk of further audit is an important factor. Tax professionals foresee that IRBM will 
further audit the voluntary disclosures made by taxpayers which discourage them 
from participating in VDP. Therefore, they agree that VDP participation will be 
increasing if IRBM accepts the voluntary disclosures of past omissions without 
further checking. A low standard deviation shows tax professional responses are 






Risk of Further Audit (n=135) 
No Reason/Items Min Max Mean Std. 
Deviation  
 Risk of Further Audit     
1 IRBM will Further Audit the 
Voluntary Disclosures submitted by 
Taxpayers in VDP. 
 
2 5 4.13 0.786 
2 The Fear of Further Audit Discourages 
Taxpayers from Participating in VDP.  
 
2 5 4.17 0.739 
3 If IRBM accepts the Disclosures made 
by Taxpayers without Further Audit, 
More Taxpayers will Participate in 
VDP. 
1 5 4.37 0.741 
 
 
4.8.4 Promotion Efforts by IRBM 
As demonstrated in Table 4.10, in term of promotion efforts on VDP, tax 
professionals disagree that IRBM has promoted VDP sufficiently to taxpayers, thus 
they are not aware of the VDP. Hence, they agree that IRBM should increase 
promotion of the VDP to attract and encourage more taxpayers to participate. Similar 
to other reasons, a low standard deviation for all the items reflects that the scores are 













Promotion Efforts by IRBM (n=135) 
No Reason/Items Min Max Mean Std. 
Deviation  
 Promotion efforts by IRBM     
1 VDP has been Promoted Intensively to 
Taxpayers. 
 
1 5 2.82 0.863 
2 Taxpayers are well Aware of VDP 
Implemented IRBM.  
 
1 5 2.70 0.829 
3 IRBM should Increase Promotion of 
the VDP in order to Attract and 
Encourage Taxpayers to Participate. 
1 5 3.89 0.789 
 
 
4.9 Rank of the Reasons Contributing to VDP Participation 
Based on the mean value obtained from data analysis, the reasons for VDP 
participation was ranked as shown in table 4.10. Size of penalty reduction had the 
highest ranking followed by risk of further audit whereby both has recorded mean 
value above 4.00 for all the statements. Fear of detection and punishment was ranked 
as the third important reason contributing to VDP participation and lastly promotion 
efforts by IRBM with total mean value of 9.41.  
 
Table 4.11 
Ranking of Reasons 
Reasons Mean value Ranking 
Size of Penalty Reduction   12.77 1 
Risk of Further Audit 12.67 2 
Fear of Detection and Punishment 10.62 3 








Chapter four has focused on discussing on the results retrieved from SPSS version 
19.0 on three kinds of analyses done; descriptive analyses, reliability analyses and 
validity analyses in order to test the data obtained. For all the variables studied, 
Cronbach’s Alpha values were more than 0.70 whereas normality test indicated that 
all the data were distributed normally. In addition, the validity test shows all the 
variables has KMO value of more than 0.60. It was found that all four reasons are 
influencing taxpayers participation in VDP although the magnitude of agreement is 
differs. The next chapter; chapter 5 presents discussion of the findings, conclusion and 


















DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the study. The main findings with regard to the study 
objectives are discussed. In addition, the suggestion and opinion of the respondents 
regarding VDP in Malaysia also presented, followed by the strengths and limitations 
of this research study. Finally, overall conclusion ends the study report.  
 
5.2 Discussions of Findings 
As elaborated in Chapter 1, the ultimate objective of the study is to determine tax 
professionals’ perceptions on reasons contributing to taxpayers’ participation in VDP. 
Basically, tax professionals agree that all the reasons listed are contributing to VDP 
participation although the level of agreement for each factor differs. Size of penalty 
reduction records the highest mean value (12.77). Obviously, monetary incentive 
provided under VDP is the main attraction that influences taxpayer’s decision to 
disclose past omissions. This result is consistent with standard tax-evasion theory 
which predicts that a rational taxpayer only participate in VDP or amnesty disclosure 
programmes if enforcement, penalty or tax parameters are varied with the amnesty in 
a way that provide extra incentives to take part (Alm & Beck, 1991). Apart from that, 
this result also in line with a few studies conducted abroad. For instance, Farrar and 
Hausserman (2016) conducted a study in the United States and concluded that desire 
to avoid penalty is the most influential motivation in taxpayers amnesty decision-





amnesty participation in Indonesia is the highest when tariff (penalty) rate offered was 
the lowest. Correspondingly, OECD (2015) stated that if the total of tax liability and 
penalty under VDP is higher than the value of asset, taxpayer might not be motivated 
to participate. 
 
Given a strong agreement from respondents to reduce the existing VDP penalty rate, a 
comparison has been made to one of the neighboring country, Singapore. Voluntary 
disclosure concessionary penalty rate in Singapore is presented in Table 5.1. Clearly, 
VDP penalty rate in Malaysia is still much higher than Singapore. Based on the Table 
5.1, Singapore waive penalty for any disclosures or amendments within one year from 
submission date and 5% penalty if the disclosures are made after one year whereas 
Malaysia imposes a maximum of 35% as shown in Table 1.1 in Chapter 1.  
 
Table 5.1 
Voluntary Disclosure Penalty Rate in Singapore 
Period of making voluntary disclosures 
Tax Audit Framework effective from 01 
February 2015 
One year from tax return due date No Penalty imposed 
After one year 5% 
Source: Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS) 
 
This indicates a necessity for a reform in VDP penalty regime. Tax professionals also 
perceived that the size of penalty reduction is not attractive in Malaysian VDP. They 





i. “VDP rate should be around 0-5% to attract taxpayers to disclose their omissions or 
error. If the IRB did not pick up the case, the tax will never be collected. However, if the 
VDP rate is zero, it will encourage the taxpayer to admit their mistakes and remit the 
additional tax to IRB” 
ii. “There should be an “incentive” for companies to opt for VDP. The differential 
in penalty rate is not attractive at all as taxpayers are exposed to risk of audit of 
VDP cases in future.  
iii. “To only penalise if the additional tax payable based on the voluntary disclosure 
exceed 10% of the initial assessment submitted by taxpayer” 
 
Risk of further audit also recorded high mean value (12.67) and ranked second 
indicating a strong agreement that many taxpayers in Malaysia is really concern that 
their disclosure under VDP will give rise to further audit by IRBM. Hence, the risk of 
further audit becomes one of the major deterrents to VDP participation. In view of the 
foregoing which might resulted in failure of VDP implementation, OECD suggested 
that a clear guidance must be issued on VDP to assure the public that disclosures 
during VDP is confidential and will not affect the future compliance activity (OECD, 
2015). Also, Marchese (2014) stressed that auditing powers should be excluded or 
limited during VDP to boost taxpayers participation. This argument is supported by 
tax professionals as they commented as follows;  
i. “IRBM should not classify VDP participants as their focused group of tax defaulters. 
They should be treated as other compliant taxpayers for future audit activities” 
ii. “IRBM should not open back the assessment for the years which taxpayers opt to 





The third reason that contributes to taxpayer participation is fear of detection and 
punishment with cumulative mean value of 10.62. Tax professionals acknowledge 
that taxpayers who have greater fear of detection and punishment will likely to 
participate in VDP, although maintain a neutral perspective on IRBM’s future audit 
probability. This result indicates that although tax professionals participated in the 
survey is not sure about IRBM’s enforcement capability, they agree that taxpayers 
will participate in VDP if they think that IRBM is capable to detect their error or 
omissions. This result has supported previous studies which emphasize that detection 
probability and fear of punishment has made VDP attractive to tax evaders (Alm, 
1990; Fisher et. al., 1989; Graetz and Wilde, 1993; Bayer et. al., 2014). 
 
VDP is targeting non-compliant taxpayers who are avail themselves of VDP to pay 
tax plus penalty (OECD, 2015). These tax defaulters pays taxes because they afraid of 
getting caught and penalized. Indeed, fear of detection and punishment is the factor 
triggered them to participate in VDP. Therefore, there is still ample of avenue to 
improve the enforcement activities by IRBM in order to have a significant impact on 
fear of detection and punishments among taxpayers.  
 
In addition to the three reasons discussed above, from the perspective of tax 
professionals, promotion efforts by IRBM do influence taxpayer participation in VDP 
although the level of agreement is moderate with total mean value of 9.41. Tax 
professionals believed that many taxpayers are not aware of VDP implemented by 
IRBM. Thus, they are of the opinion that IRBM should increase promotion of the 





previous literatures, promotion efforts of VDP must include enhancement of 
enforcement activities in the post VDP period in order to create fear and awareness 
among tax evaders.  This result also similar with overseas studies which emphasized 
the importance of publication efforts to ensure that the programmes reach targeted 
participants (Parle & Hirlinger, 1986; Mikesell, 1986; Ross & Buckwalter, 2013). In 
order to ensure the implementation and advantage of VDP reach the targeted 
taxpayers and tax defaulters, tax professionals have given the following suggestions; 
“IRB should organise more campaigns and increase the range of publicity to let more 
people know about VDP through social media, IRB talk show and other main TV 
channels” 
 
5.3 Theoretical Implications of the Study 
This study extends and contributes to the literature on VDP or tax amnesty by 
identifying reasons or motives for taxpayer participation in VDP within Malaysian 
context. Since there is no published academic study on VDP in Malaysia as at the 
completion of this study, this study will enhance the understanding on Malaysian 
VDP and opens unique windows for future research. On top of that, the conceptual 
framework developed in this study can be useful for future researches to further 
investigate on these issues. Besides that, the self-developed questionnaire to measure 
reasons for VDP participation which has been content validated by experts and 
construct validated using factor analysis can be a useful reference for studies in this 
area. Thus, this study not only contributes to fill the theoretical gap in VDP 






5.4 Practical Implications of the Study 
As explained earlier, the main purpose of this study was to address the reasons for 
poor participation in VDP implemented by IRBM. Therefore the major practical 
contribution of this research is that it provides much needed input on VDP 
participation which will allow IRBM to redesign the future VDP accordingly. This 
study advocates for a clear guideline on VDP as practiced by other countries. Apart 
from clarifying the submission procedures, the guidelines should include clarification 
for various doubts arisen on VDP participation. In addition, the concessionary penalty 
rate for VDP needs to be revised in order to make it more attractive to tax defaulters. 
Participation in VDP could be increased if the cost of voluntary disclosure is 
significantly less than if being caught by enforcement actions. This study also urges 
for assuring the public that information disclosed during VDP are confidential and 
will not be subject to further audits besides promoting effectively the benefits of VDP 
and consequences for failing to grab the opportunity. Besides that, it may be worth 
considering the suggestions provided by tax professionals to boost VDP participation. 
Apart from that, the reasons studied also applicable to other tax administrators around 
the world who are considering VDP as a strategy to enhance tax compliance.  
 
5.5 Limitations of the Study 
This study is not exceptional from its limitations. The limitations which could affect 
the generalizability of the findings could be due to the VDP participation reasons 
were only measured from the tax professionals’ perspectives. Thus, in order for the 
findings to be more representative, views from other stakeholders such as tax payers 






Besides that, this study has concentrated only on four reasons that lead to VDP 
participation. There are other aspects that could be considered such as guilt coalitions 
and strategic delinquency as documented by some studies in other countries which is 
more suitable to be asked to taxpayers instead of tax professionals. In addition, the 
study results would be more effective if the respondents are those participated or 
would consider participating in VDP but it would be infeasible and challenging to 
recruit them as respondents.  
 
The instrument (questionnaire) used in this study was self-developed. Although the 
validity has been tested, there are avenues for improvement in order to measure the 
reasons more accurately in other research settings. To date, no published literature is 
available on VDP in Malaysia, thus no data for comparison of the study outcome. 
Hence, the results were compared with studies conducted in other countries in which 
the VDP design might be different as well as the tax law and respondents’ attitude. 
 
5.6 Recommendations for Future Research 
This thesis explores the reasons for taxpayer participation in VDP from tax 
professionals’ point of view. Given the limitations of the study and lack of success of 
VDP in Malaysia, there are a number of avenues for future research. Future study may 
evaluate or focus on other reasons which contribute to VDP participation among 
taxpayers in Malaysia as suggested in the previous section. It would also be valuable 
to obtain the views of other stakeholders, especially taxpayers and IRBM in order to 





to evaluate the VDP in Malaysia in term of the effectiveness of the programme to 
IRBM and taxpayers. Further study is needed to establish empirical evidence of the 
relationship between influencing factors and VDP participation such as suggested in 
the conceptual framework of this study to enhance understanding and provide further 
theoretical contribution to taxation literature.   
 
5.7 Conclusion 
VDP is a good tax policy to improve tax compliance and administration if executed 
carefully. Various aspects need to be considered to implement a successful VDP 
without compromising the existing enforcement efforts. This study explores the 
reasons that contribute to taxpayer participation in Malaysian VDP from the 
perspective of tax professionals. In total, four reasons namely, size of penalty 
reduction, fear of detection and punishment, risk of further audit and promotion 
efforts by IRBM had been examined and discussed in this thesis.  
 
This study could be considered as the first attempt in understanding the VDP 
implementation in Malaysia.  Despite the outlined limitations, this study contributes 
to the literature by way of providing knowledge and understanding from evidence 
gathered in the Malaysian tax system context and it is expected that the findings will 
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APPENDIX A 
Universit i  Utara Malaysia 
Survey Questionnaire 
Dear Respondent, 
I am conducting a study on reasons contributing to taxpayer participation in voluntary disclosure 
programme in Malaysia from tax professionals' perspective. Voluntary Disclosure Programmes (VDP) 
also known as Tax Amnesties provides taxpayers with a potential avenue to rectify error or omissions in 
past tax returns without being subject to some or all of the financial and criminal penalties. 
Therefore, I am happy to inform you that you have been chosen to participate in this survey. 
Please be advised that there is no right or wrong answer, only your views and opinions on each of the 
statements are required. Your responses are highly critical in achieving the objectives of this study. I 
assure you that confidentiality of your answer and the data collected will be used only for the purpose of 
this study. Please answer all questions. 
In case you may require further information regarding this study, please contact me at: 
Mr. Balamurugan- 0127990626 I e-mail: balamurugan@hasil.gov.my. 
Thank you for sparing your precious time. 
Yours Sincerely, 
$. J5afafn.UT'Uf /,f,ll­ 
BALAMURUGAN SINAPAYAN 
Student, M.Sc. International Accounting 
Universiti Utara Malaysia 
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APPENDIX A 
Section 1: DEMOGRAPHIC DATA: Respondent's profile. 
Please (v) in the appropriate box. 
1: Gender 




31-40 D 41 and above D 
3. Qualification Diploma D Degree D Professional Qualification D Masters/Phd D 
5. Location Johor Bahru D Kuala Lumpur D Other ___ o 
(If other, please specify) 
6. How many years have you been working in this organization? 
1-5 0 6-10 0 11 - 15  0 16-20  0 above 20 0 
7. Have you ever handle a VDP case? 
If yes, how many cases? __ case(s). 
Yes D No D 
Section 2: Assessment on factors contributing to VDP participation. Please respond to the 
following statements by circling the appropriate option: 
I-Strongly Disagree, 2-Disagree, 3- Neutral, 4-Agree, 5-Strongly agree. 
2.1 Size of penalty reduction 
No Statements Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
disagree agree 
1. The size of penalty reduction is important in VDP 
1 2 3 4 5 
implementation. 
2. Current penalty structure offered by IRBM for VDP is 
very attractive to influence more taxpayers to 1 2 3 4 5 
participate. 
3. VDP in Malaysia will be more effective if the size of 
1 2 3 4 5 
penalty reduction is higher. 
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2.2 Fear of detection and punishment 
APPENDIX A 
No Statements Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
disagree agree 
1. The probability to detect mistakes/omissions by IRBM 
3 4 s 1 2 
is low. 
2. Taxpayers who have greater fear of detection will 
1 2 3 4 s 
likely to participate in VDP. 
3. Taxpayers will participate in VDP if IRBM enforcement 
4 s 1 2 3 
activities are enhanced. 
2.3 Risk of further audit 
No Statements Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
disagree agree 
1. IRBM will further audit the voluntary disclosures 
1 2 3 4 s 
submitted by taxpayers in VDP. 
2. The fear of further audit discourages taxpayers from 
1 2 3 4 s 
participating in VDP. 
3. If IRBM accepts the disclosures made by taxpayers 
without further audit, more taxpayers will participate 1 2 3 4 s 
in VDP. 
2.4 Promotion efforts by I RBM 
No Statements Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
disagree agree 
1. VDP has been promoted intensively to taxpayers. 1 2 3 4 s 
2. Taxpayers are well aware of VDP implemented by 
IRBM. 
1 2 3 4 s 
3. IRBM should increase promotion of the VDP in order 
1 2 3 4 s 
to attract and encourage taxpayers to participate. 
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I Section 3: Suggestions 
Please provide suggestions to improve VDP participation in Malaysia. 
THANK YOII FOR YOIIR COOPERATION 
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